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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to analyse fiscal policy in former
Yugoslavian countries over the period 2001–2014. The contribu-
tion of the paper is threefold; first, we build a homogeneous
database to describe the evolution of the main fiscal aggregates
in each country using an identical analytical structure. Second, we
analyse the composition of national tax revenues to determine
whether common patterns are still present, or if they have
evolved in different ways over time. Third, we pool data to ana-
lyse and compute the elasticity of budget imbalance, taxes and
expenditure to the output gap. Our results show that tax revenue
composition is still similar and that the economic cycle is very
relevant in explaining the dynamics of both deficit and expend-
iture over Gross Domestic Product, but not revenues.
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Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, its former republics (Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) have taken dif-
ferent paths; however, one common denominator for all of them is the European
path. On their way towards the European Union (E.U.), all countries have had to
undergo a process of transition from a centrally planned, socialist economy towards a
free market economy. This also includes guaranteeing fiscal stability by implementing
new economic policies and institutional reforms.
The previous literature on fiscal issues in former Yugoslavian countries is mostly
focused on single-country crises and other specific topics. By contrast, this paper
adopts a cross-country perspective and deals with the main fiscal aggregates such as
deficit, total expenditures and total revenues. Our main target is to partially fill this
gap using cross-country data. Cross-country studies involve the possibility of compar-
ing evolutions from a common starting point; secession is a type of natural experi-
ment. Moreover, it increases the sample size for performing econometric analysis on
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basic fiscal aggregates, and this is relevant insofar as the time span of the series is
limited at this point in time. In particular, we compile an integrated database1 and
then focus on two targets. First, we analyse the evolution of key fiscal aggregates with
the aim of general macroeconomic stability and for the process of integration into
the E.U. in particular, and evaluate the dynamics of tax revenue composition.
Unfortunately, the lack of data on expenditure composition makes this kind of dual
budget analysis impossible. Second, we pool data to compute the elasticity of deficit,
taxes and expenditure to the estimated output gap. This aspect is relevant from a pol-
icy standpoint insofar as fiscal stability depends not only on structural deficit but also
on the effect of the business cycle on both revenues and expenditures. A positive out-
put gap involves additional tax collection and a reduction in some expenditure pro-
grammes (for instance, unemployment insurance, thanks to a cut in the
unemployment rate). Combining both effects, a reduction in deficit is expected.
To accomplish our targets, this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, a survey
of the available literature on fiscal issues in former Yugoslavian countries is provided.
Section 3 presents data and specifications, as well as a cluster analysis merging coun-
tries of interest with all E.U. countries. Section 4 analyses the relationship between
the economic cycle and fiscal variables, including deficit, expenditure and taxes.
Finally, Section 5 focuses on policy implications and extensions of this research.
2. Brief survey of literature
The literature on fiscal matters in former Yugoslavian countries is still underdevel-
oped, and the reason for this becomes clear when attention is paid to the use of
cross-country data in analytical papers.
Concerning papers on the main dynamics of fiscal variables, most focus on the
influence of the Great Recession. Mencinger and Aristovnik (2014) compare the cyc-
lical behaviour of E.U. countries’ fiscal policies between 2004 and 2012 with fiscal
policy measures taken in Slovenia during the economic crisis. The adopted necessary
consolidation measures implemented by Slovenia did not vary substantively from
other E.U. countries. The policy debate on the size of fiscal multipliers was also pre-
sent in former Yugoslavian countries. Grdovic Gnip (2015) used a structural vector
auto regression (S.V.A.R.) approach to conclude that output reacted negatively to a
tax shock and positively to government spending shocks in Croatia from 1996 to
2011. The cumulative output multiplier following four quarters is 2.45 for govern-
ment spending, similar to that found by Simovic and Deskar-Skrbic (2013). Jemec
et al. (2013), using an S.V.A.R. approach for Slovenia from 1995 to 2010, made a
similar discovery: one-time fiscal spending shocks tend to increase output (multiplier
equals 1.6), while a tax shock decreases it (multiplier at 0.4); however, effects become
irrelevant in the long run (more than three years). Koczan (2015) also analyses the
period of the Great Recession and identifies the main problems in their public sec-
tors: wages and pensions constitute a very rigid and large share of the overall spend-
ing. The latter combined with a decline in public revenues due to the crisis disturbed
the budget balance, which consequently led to a build-up of public debt. Future chal-
lenges to be faced are structural changes and fiscal consolidations, particularly in the
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area of reviewing current expenditures. However, the set of countries is slightly differ-
ent insofar as it relies upon the concept of the ‘Western Balkans’. This term is used
to denominate Balkan countries that are not members of the E.U. With the former
Yugoslavian countries in mind, this excludes Croatia and Slovenia, but includes
Albania and Kosovo.2
When the focus is on the elasticity of budget balances expressed in relation to
Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.) to G.D.P. changes, there are virtually no papers on
these issues in former Yugoslavian countries. However, Slovenia and Croatia are cov-
ered in some cases by papers on E.U. countries. The existing cross-country studies on
budgetary elasticity in European countries are summarised in Table 1. In particular,
Viren (2014), who analysed the EU15 countries over the period 1970–2011, found
that deficit elasticities with respect to output growth appear to be around 0.46. He
sets up a specification that includes public deficit, revenues or expenditure on the left
side of the equation and a lagged endogenous variable, real G.D.P. growth, general
government debt and real interest rate on the right side. Using similar samples,
Staehr (2008) with EU27 and Fincke and Wolski (2016) with 10 new E.U. member
countries obtained similar elasticities of 0.496 and 0.337, respectively. Nevertheless,
Tujula and Wolswijk (2007) and Kabashi (2014) obtained much lower coefficients for
the same elasticity by using a similar methodology. Both specifications include the
budget balance as the dependent variable with country-specific dummies. However,
the former performs panel regressions, while the latter uses generalised method of
moments (G.M.M.) estimates. Vegh and Vuletin (2015), on the other hand, only deal
with the cyclicality of taxes; they divide their sample into developed and industrialised
countries to obtain a tax index whose base is a weighted average of personal income
tax, corporate income tax and value-added tax (V.A.T.). The estimates of the tax
index (tax revenues) are performed using country fixed effects, with the regressor
being the cyclical component of the real G.D.P.
A second set of papers aims at computing elasticities using a different method-
ology. Instead of relying upon econometrics, global elasticities are estimated as the
aggregation of individual elasticities of both expenditure and revenue components.
Bouthevillain et al. (2001) measure their sensitivity with respect to G.D.P. by using an
elasticity formula, which reflects the response of the budget balance to changes in
economic activity, to obtain an elasticity of 0.53. Similarly, in other papers that ana-
lyse the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) and
EU28 countries, such as Mourre, Astarita, and Princen (2014) and Girouard and
Andre (2005), the overall cyclical sensitivity of the budget is measured by the semi-
elasticity of the budget balance (as a percentage of G.D.P.) with respect to the output
gap. In these studies, the overall budget elasticity is computed using the individual
cyclical elasticities of the four categories of taxes (corporate tax, personal tax, indirect
tax and social security contributions) and the one expenditure item (current expend-
iture), weighted by their respective shares in G.D.P. In these cases, the influence of
the output gap variable was between 0.4 and 0.5, calculated as an arithmetic average
for the group of countries in the sample. Another paper with similar methodology is
Altar, Necula, and Bobeica (2010), which deals with Romania and obtains a lower
result of 0.290.
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3. Fiscal variables: data and preliminary analysis
Our sample covers the period 2001–2014, but the starting point is not the same in all
cases due to the reasons explained below. Public deficit is defined as ‘net lending/bor-
rowing’. This position of the budget balance is considered, according to the
International Monetary Fund’s (I.M.F.) Government Finance Statistics Manual
(G.F.S.M.) 2014,3 to be ‘the basic indicator of the fiscal balance, measured from
‘above-the-line’ as revenue minus expenditure’. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia
and Slovenia, the fiscal data were obtained from the Government Finance Statistics
(G.F.S.) data portal of the I.M.F. Owing to the unavailability of earlier data, the series
for Bosnia and Herzegovina starts in 2005. In the case of Croatia, no data before
2002 was used because the reporting standard changed from the G.F.S. 1986 to the
G.F.S. 2001 in mid-2004. Thereafter, the calculations were only performed retro-
actively for the previous three years. Time series data for Macedonia and Montenegro
start at nearly the same time, 2005 and 2006, respectively. The data for Macedonia
were available in the monthly Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of
Macedonia.4 As for data regarding Montenegro, the time series begins in 2006, the
same year Montenegro declared independence. The data were obtained courtesy of
the Ministry of Finance of Montenegro.5 Lastly, the time series for Serbia was avail-
able in the monthly Bulletin Public Finances issued by the Ministry of Finance of
Serbia.6 Owing to a lack of data for the autonomous province of Kosovo and
Metohija, this region was not included in the coverage for the Republic of Serbia.
Furthermore, after the declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo appears in inter-
national databases as a separate country. However, as the time series data in the
G.F.S. data portal of the I.M.F. begin in 2011, the authors decided to exclude Kosovo
from the analysis.
While data sources are different for each country, homogeneity is guaranteed by
the fact that in all cases it is based on the I.M.F.’s G.F.S.M. Data for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia are presented according to the G.F.S.M. 2014,
while Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro use the G.F.S.M. 1986.7 As for the country
level, in all cases it covered annual8 data on general government and all extra-budget-
ary funds.
The G.D.P. data source for calculating the output gap was the World Development
Indicators from the World Bank. The unit of measurement for G.D.P. is constant
2011 international dollars converted using purchasing power parity rates. The output
gap was computed using the Hodrick–Prescott (H.P.) filter (Hodrick & Prescott,
1997) over a sample from 1993 to 2015. The parameter k was set at 4 according to
the Ravn–Uhlig frequency rule (Ravn & Uhlig, 2002). The variable is defined as fol-
lows:





According to the formula, a positive output gap emerges when the actual output is
greater than the potential output.9
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The mid-2000s still saw rapid growth across the region largely driven by external
borrowing for consumption and construction. Furthermore, this period matched the
comfortable global environment at the time and increasing confidence in the conver-
gence process of these countries with the E.U. (Roaf, Atoyan, Joshi, & Krogulski,
2014). Knowing this makes it easy to explain the peak in output gap that was reached
for all six countries in 2008. Until the appearance of the economic crisis, a positive
output gap was working well for all countries, with the actual output being above the
potential output (Figure 1). During this period, the economies were working at more
than full capacity (‘overheating’). After the recession, however, the situation changed
dramatically. The imbalances that the recession brought made the former Yugoslavian
economies very vulnerable. A spillover effect reached these countries by 2009, when
their budget deficits reached all-time lows in the first decade of the 21st century. The
impact was manifested in the continuance of below-potential growth, high unemploy-
ment and fragile financial markets (Roaf et al., 2014). The linkages with international
trade partners made the countries vulnerable which, combined with low levels of
employment, high public debt and current account deficits, greatly impacted
the countries.
A graph showing budget deficit data is presented in Figure 2. Former Yugoslavian
countries managed to cope with the fiscal pressures after their secessions. It is clear
that all countries have a joint downwards slope. The reasons for this can be found in
the consequences of the world economic crisis from 2007/2008, which started in these
countries with a delayed effect. In fact, even 2007 was a downturn point for every
country except Croatia, whose deficit took a downwards turn in 2008. Nevertheless,
all countries reached their low points between 2012 and 2014, with the sole exception
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A sharp decline in capital inflows led to economic reces-
sions and modest recoveries thereafter. The former was caused by an overall decline
in international trade and transactions. The economies were vulnerable externally and
Figure 1. Output Gap (as % G.D.P.). Source: World Bank and authors’ calculations.
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linked by trade to all major countries that were themselves experiencing problems as
a result of the crisis. Another interesting feature of Figure 2 is the case of Slovenia,
whose budget deficit more than tripled in 2013, only to recover in the following two
years. This is due to an emergency recapitalisation of the country’s banks, performed
by the government by pumping 3.6 billion euros into the banking sector in order to
avert an international bailout.
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of public expenditure across all six former
Yugoslavian countries. The countries with the highest expenditure in terms of G.D.P.
percentage are Serbia and Slovenia. On the other hand, Macedonia has the lowest.
With the exception of Macedonia, which has also had a steady increase in expend-
iture, the countries can be described as having a tendency towards expenditure
growth over time, especially after the crisis. Therefore, tight fiscal policies and auster-
ity measures were recommended by both the E.U. and the I.M.F. These two institu-
tions had the last word in terms of external funding and providing advice to Balkan
countries. With this in mind, the conclusions made for the former Yugoslavian coun-
tries by these institutions were that there was a need to build up the flexibility of the
economy and increase the capacity of the economy to grow. Practically speaking, this
would imply a reduction in debt, the implementation of structural reforms that would
attract investments to the trading sector and an increase in savings as a consequence
of economic growth (Koczan, 2015).
Total revenue has also had similar dynamics for all six of our countries of interest
(Figure 4). The early 2000s were a time of fiscal consolidation and restructuring. A
V.A.T. was introduced and public revenues were stabilising after the war in the
1990s. However, steady development and slight growth were replaced by sharp
declines in public revenues after the crisis. The turning point came in the years 2008
and 2009, when revenues in all countries started to plummet. Nevertheless, stabilisa-
tion occurred after 2011 when every country except Macedonia began experiencing
growth. Throughout the entire period observed, the process of European integration
Figure 2. Budget balance (as % G.D.P.). Source: Countries’ respective Ministries of Finance.
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is apparent in the customs contributions, which seem to have decreased in all coun-
tries. The collapse in tax revenues, together with the difficulty in scaling back spend-
ing, resulted in a significant deterioration of fiscal positions and a build-up of debt
(Koczan, 2015).
In order to analyse tax revenue composition and the evolution of tax revenues
over time, we pool the countries of interest with a wide set of neighbouring countries.
If the common patterns are strong enough, the existence of a cluster inside the pool
should be detected. In particular, the analysis includes data of the tax categories in 34
countries: 26 of these are E.U. members (excluding Slovenia and Croatia), three are
members of the European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.) and the remaining five
are former Yugoslavian countries. The time span of the available data ranges from
2001 to 2014. One former Yugoslavian country had to be excluded from the analysis
owing to lack of data for tax categories, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina. The varia-
bles used include total tax revenues and their seven tax categories expressed as a per-
centage of G.D.P.: personal income tax, corporate income tax, V.A.T., customs,
excise, social contributions, and other taxes. This kind of classification was imposed
by the availability of data for some countries. Later, the others were adapted so a
homogeneous dataset could be constructed. The computations were made using the
Stata 14 statistical package.
Figure 3. Expenditures (as % G.D.P.). Source: Countries’ respective Ministries of Finance.
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Based on the available data, we use average values for the two seven-year periods
of 2001–2007 and 2008–2014. The analysis uses the average linkage clustering method
and Euclidean distance as the similarity or dissimilarity measures. We perform a clus-
ter analysis for each period; the corresponding dendrograms are presented in Figures
5 and 6. Since we use average linkage clustering and an average of all distances
between points from different clusters, the Y axis provides a measure of such close-
ness of individual data points.
In both periods, countries can be organised into five main clusters: two of those
clusters hold in both periods (Denmark and Sweden on the one hand; and the
United Kingdom and Iceland on the other), and a third cluster is almost the same in
both cases (Belgium, Austria, France, Italy, Finland and Norway). These clusters are
all characterised by having high tax revenues. However, the third cluster, to which
more countries belong, differs from the two smaller ones for one important reason:
social contributions in this cluster are somewhat higher than the rest of the countries
in the sample in both periods.10
The main feature of concern to us is that four out of the five former Yugoslavian
republics belong to the same cluster in both periods. In the first period, they are
joined by the Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Poland, Slovakia, the
Netherlands, Hungary, Germany and Luxembourg. In the second period, the same
cluster is subject to some changes, with Estonia joining it and Slovakia leaving it.
Although they belong to a large cluster, the former Yugoslavian countries are closely
positioned within the same cluster in both periods. Moreover, the data on tax revenue
decomposition in Appendix 1 shows that the values of tax variables for the three
countries placed together in the sub-cluster in both periods all fall within a 2% range.
The only former Yugoslavian country that is located separately from the others is
Macedonia, which is next to its geographical neighbours, Bulgaria and Romania. The
reason for the difference in the position of Macedonia in the tree diagram is found in
Figure 4. Total revenues (as % G.D.P.). Source: Countries’ respective Ministries of Finance.
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Figure 5. Dendrogram for tax revenue composition, Period 2001–2007. Source: Authors’
calculations.
Figure 6. Dendrogram for tax revenue composition. Period 2008–2014. Source: Authors’
calculations.
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the two tax categories that have a joint weight of 70%: the V.A.T. and social contribu-
tions. On the one hand, V.A.T. constitutes a lower share of the tax revenues in
Macedonia than in the other former Yugoslavian countries. On the other hand, when
it comes to social contributions, Macedonia has the lowest percentage of G.D.P. of all
the former Yugoslavian countries in both periods, with a difference of over 2% of
the G.D.P.
4. Econometric analysis of the budget balance elasticity of deficits and
their components
4.1 Econometric specifications and methodology
The first dependent variable is deficit and the regressors are output gap and the
lagged endogenous deficitt-1 (Equation 2). As for the remaining elements in the equa-
tion, ai stands for the country effects, kt for the period fixed effects, b for the coeffi-
cient of the independent variable, q for the coefficient of the lagged endogenous
variable and eit for the error term. In order to break down the effect of output gap
on both sides of the budget, in Equations (3) and (4) expenditure or revenues replace
deficit. As in previous sections, variables are expressed as ratios over G.D.P.:11
deficitit ¼ ai þ kt þ b  output gapit þ q  deficitit1 þ eit (2)
expenditureit ¼ ai þ kt þ b  output gapit þ q  expenditureit1 þ eit (3)
revenuesit ¼ ai þ kt þ b  output gapit þ q  revenuesit1 þ eit (4)
The methodology used in the analysis is a simple and frequently used procedure
for computing elasticities. More sophisticated equations, such as the ones used by
Bouthevillain et al. (2001), Mourre et al. (2014) and Girouard and Andre (2005),
were discarded due to the small sample size.12 As stated above, in the related litera-
ture some studies used variables other than the output gap. For instance, Viren
(2014) and Tujula and Wolswijk, (2007) use the growth rate of the G.D.P. However,
the output gap is a better option insofar as it captures cyclical positions more effect-
ively than simple annual growth rates.13 In addition, other control variables are used
in the literature (Table 1). In preliminary estimates, we also include unemployment
and inflation as right-hand variables, but neither was significant.
Empirical analysis was performed using the statistical software EViews 9.5. The
basic statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2. A battery of specification tests
on Equation (3) was performed. Concerning the redundancy of both individual and
period fixed effects, the corresponding tests confirm their relevance. In contrast, a
Wald test on cross-section slope homogeneity clearly supports the validity of the con-
strained equation assuming common slopes (p-value ¼ 0.78), meaning that pooling
data makes sense. The Breusch-Godfrey test on AR(1) autocorrelation shows that this
is not an issue. Moreover, all variables are stationary according to the results of both
augmented Dickey–Fuller (A.D.F.) and Levin, Lin, and Chu (L.L.C.) unit root tests.
In contrast, the hypothesis of cross-sectional dependence cannot be rejected at the 5%
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level according to the results of the Pesaran C.D. test (Pesaran, 2004). For this reason,
we report t-statistics computed on ordinary least square (O.L.S.) residuals and robust
t-statistics computed using panel-corrected standard errors (P.C.S.E.) to comprehen-
sively deal with both cross-sectional dependence and heteroscedasticity (Beck & Katz,
1995). All in all, the results provided by the two formulas are essentially the same.
However, Pooled O.L.S. is subject to two shortcomings. First, including both fixed
effects and the lagged endogenous variable leads to the so-called Nickell bias (Nickell,
1981). Although this bias is of the order 1/T, and T is not very small in our case, the
potential bias is not negligible. Second, the potential endogeneity of the output gap is
a result of the Keynesian effects of public deficit. In order to deal with both problems,
we also compute a panel G.M.M. estimator. Taking into account the small N dimen-
sion of the panel, we choose the one-stage Arellano–Bond differenced estimator and
discarded more sophisticated and informationally demanding estimators (two stages
or system G.M.M.). A variable number of lagged values of the endogenous variable is
used as the instrument, constrained by the sample size and the values of both the
Hansen test and Arellano–Bond AR(2) autocorrelation test. In most cases, the main
results hold using Pooled O.L.S. (P.O.L.S.) or G.M.M.
4.2 Results
Results are reported in Table 3. The main result is that the deficit is statistically and
significantly influenced by the output gap. The coefficients on this variable in the first
two columns are between 1.02 and 1.70, with t-statistics between 3.43 and 3.15,
respectively. Equations (3) and (4) split the deficit into their two direct components,
expenditure and revenues. All comments and choices on specification Equation (2)
discussed above are imposed in both cases. While the ratio of total revenues to
G.D.P. is not influenced by the cycle, that of expenditures to G.D.P. is, with average
elasticities around –1.25.14 Hence, deficit elasticity to the output gap is fully explained
by expenditures. The positive value of the output gap coefficient in Equation (2), as
well as a negative value of the same coefficient in Equation (3), indicates countercycli-
cal fiscal policy in the considered period.
In order to check the robustness of results concerning the reported inelasticity of
the ratio of revenues to G.D.P. with regard to changes in the output gap, Equation
Table 2. Main descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Observations
Deficit 2.99 3.17 6.60 15.02 66
Expenditures 41.94 42.22 60.31 31.50 66
Total revenues 38.95 39.50 45.29 27.66 66
Personal income tax 3.82 3.19 5.77 2.03 56
Corporate income tax 1.63 1.57 3.18 0.59 56
Value-added tax 10.33 10.36 14.67 7.88 56
Excises 3.95 3.91 5.44 3.19 56
Customs 0.92 0.79 2.64 0.00 56
Other tax revenue 1.49 1.07 4.13 0.17 56
Social contributions 12.06 11.96 15.24 8.37 56
Output gap 0.06 0.51 6.63 2.69 78
All variables are expressed as a percentage of G.D.P. Fewer observations for tax category data is due to lack of data
for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Source: Author’s calculations.
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(4) is adapted to perform individual analysis of the main tax categories (Table 4). In
most columns, the output gap is not significant; the two exceptions are the G.M.M.
estimate for V.A.T. and the P.O.L.S. estimate for social contributions. However, in
both cases the parameter is not significant at 5% or less and findings are not robust
for the estimation method, as they are in the case of deficit and expenditure.
Returning to the results summarised in Table 1, budgetary elasticity in the former
Yugoslavian countries seems to be higher than in any other European country. Our
estimates (1.02–1.71) are much higher than the ones in the analyses by Mourre et al.
(2014), at 0.50, and by Bouthevillain et al. (2001), at 0.49–0.53. Similar results are
found by Viren (2014), who used the same methodology we did (O.L.S. and G.M.M.)
to obtain the elasticity of 0.46 for the EU15 countries. However, his measure for the
economic cycle was the real G.D.P. growth instead of the output gap. Nevertheless,
the results demonstrated how the public finances of former Yugoslavian countries are
highly influenced by the economic cycle. Double elasticity of public finances in transi-
tion countries rather than European ones is not a rare finding. This idea is also
backed up by the recent developments in literature; although not explicitly focusing
on the former Yugoslavian countries, Staehr (2008) found that in the Eurozone, the
effect of the economic cycle on the budget balance is twice as strong as in new E.U.
member states. He also concluded that revenues were acyclical in new E.U. member
states. Moreover, the results of Kabashi (2014) show a stronger effect in Western
Balkan countries than in new E.U. member states. Koczan (2016) suggests that the
Table 3. Pooled O.L.S. and G.M.M. estimates of specifications [3], [4] and [5].































Number of observations 61 56 61 56 61 56
R2 0.77 0.92 0.97
Individual fixed effects 0.1213
Period fixed effects 0.0051
Wald test 0. 7803
B-G test 0. 4175 0.1320 0.2741
Pesaran CD 0. 0446
Hansen test 0.132782 0.092566 0.285777
A-B AR(2) 0.8176 0.3873 0.5907
Method P.O.L.S. G.M.M. P.O.L.S. G.M.M. P.O.L.S. G.M.M.
All estimates include both fixed individual and period effects. P-values are reported in the case of specification tests.
Individual fixed effects and period fixed effects is the F-test on the respective redundancy tests. The Wald test is
Chi-square statistic value on the null hypothesis of cross-country homogeneity in slopes. B–G is the Breusch-Godfrey
test of AR(1) autocorrelation. Pesaran CD is the Pesaran CD test on the null hypothesis of no contemporaneous cor-
relation. , , and  indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. t-statistics computed using
O.L.S. residuals in parenthesis, robust t-statistics computed using panel-corrected standard errors P.C.S.E. in brackets
(Beck & Katz, 1995). Instruments in G.M.M. include second and third lagged values for Deficit and Revenues and third
and fourth lagged values for Expenditures. Estimates are performed using EViews 9.5. Source: Author’s calculations.
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political cycle might be linked to a larger discretionary component of fiscal policy (in
this case concerning expenditures) in the Western Balkans.
While our results can also be influenced by the fact that the analysed period
includes the so-called ‘Great Recession’, they suggest the strong role of spending poli-
cies in former Yugoslavian countries as a countercyclical tool; this is in line with
results by Fincke and Wolski (2016) for new E.U. member states. However, further
research on this topic is required in order to determine which mechanisms explain
the countercyclical nature of public expenditure in former Yugoslavian countries.15 In
particular, we should determine the role played by three complementary mechanisms:
(1) automatic stabilisers (as unemployment benefits), (2) discretionary expenditure
programmes implemented for compensating the effects of crisis and (3) the rigidity
of expenditures: in general, it is an easier task for policymakers to increase expendi-
tures during boom times than it is to reduce them in troubled times.
As for the inelasticity of revenues, this proved to be the case for both European
and former Yugoslavian countries. Mourre et al. (2014) obtained an elasticity of 0.00
for an EU28 sample, which they justify by noting a marked cyclical pattern between
tax revenues and G.D.P., whose fluctuations offset each other in their ratio. On the
other hand, Viren (2014) obtained an elasticity of 0.09 for an EU15 sample.
5. Concluding remarks
The contribution of this paper to the literature on fiscal issues in former Yugoslavian
countries is threefold. First, we describe the comparative evolution of the main fiscal
aggregates of all six former republics using a new panel dataset. Second, after com-
paring the composition of their national tax revenues in a European context over
time, we have seen in the cluster analysis how there are common patterns in four of
the five analysed countries. Third, we have shown that the output gap is highly sig-
nificant in explaining the evolution of both deficit and expenditures over G.D.P. in
all countries, but not to account for the evolution of revenues over G.D.P. In fact, the
elasticity of expenditures is well above average for E.U. countries, but the elasticity of
revenues is below average. Public deficit and expenditures are both countercyclical,
while tax revenues over G.D.P. remain acyclical.
Further research is required to disentangle this result; in particular, to shed add-
itional light on the relevance of automatic stabilisers, discretionary expenditure meas-
ures and the rigidity of expenditure programmes. Understanding countercyclical
behaviour will help to define sound fiscal consolidation strategies, which is particu-
larly relevant when meeting E.U. fiscal requirements. Concerning tax inelasticity, we
should explore the extent and impact of the shadow economy and fiscal evasion in
the region, and whether they are correlated with the economic cycle.
Bearing in mind the difficulties in gathering data from heterogeneous sources, the
improvement of databases for these countries presents itself as a relevant objective. A
convergence in statistics for all of them would be possible by making efforts to par-
ticipate in international statistical coverage by, for example, Eurostat and the I.M.F.
Although there is some presence in these institutions, not all former Yugoslavian
countries are participating fully. Having homogeneous data sources would enable the
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development of viable, more sophisticated econometric studies that could help with
policy and institutional design.
Notes
1. Collecting homogeneous data for the former Yugoslavian republics was a cumbersome
task. This likely explains why cross-country studies have been so scarce until now. Since
there was no uniform source for all countries, the data had to be collected individually
for each country. Bearing in mind the different governing structures, various institutions
such as State Statistical Offices, Central Banks and Ministries of Finance had to be
contacted. Furthermore, in order to confirm their lack of data, research on the
availability of data within European institutions was also necessary. Based on availability,
in five countries, the respective Ministries of Finance were taken as a relevant source for
all fiscal variables present in the database. The exception was Bosnia and Herzegovina,
where the Central Bank has the task of collecting and presenting consolidated data for
the whole country. Although in some countries the data is usually publicly available on
their websites, others kept them for their own internal use. This meant establishing a
necessary contact and seeking data through formal channels. After compiling all the
necessary information, the raw data had to be recalculated to a joint unit of
measurement, which in our case was G.D.P. percentage. We would like to take this
opportunity to thank all of those who helped and participated in the extensive and time-
consuming data-collection process.
2. Beyond the central focus of our paper, fiscal decentralisation in Western Balkan countries
is analysed by Mazllami and Osmani (2014). They reveal a significant number of
problems in local public finances and suggest the creation of legal mechanisms for the
allocation of grants, as well as the introduction of improvements in the administrative
and managerial capacities of the municipalities. In the same vein, Diamond and Last,
(2003) confirm a lack of strategic planning for budget system reforms in all former
Yugoslavian countries.





7. Nevertheless, the compatibility of all three data sources in this sense is not questionable
due to the following explanation from the I.M.F.’s G.F.S.M. 2014 (Appendix 1. Changes
from the G.F.S.M. 2001 and G.F.S.M. 1986): ‘Another balancing item in the GFS
framework is the overall balance, defined as net lending/net borrowing adjusted through
the rearrangement of transactions in assets and liabilities that are deemed to be for
public policy purposes. … It is the equivalent of the overall deficit/surplus in the GFSM
1986, but determined using the accrual basis of recording.’
8. Ideally, a fiscal dataset that could enable a more sophisticated analysis would count on
quarterly data, such as Profeta and Scrabosetti (2017).
9. The advantages of using the output gap instead of the observed G.D.P. growth rates are
discussed in more detail in section 4.
10. Full data are reported in Appendix 1.
11. Moreover, Equation (4) is also adapted to analyse the behaviour of the main
tax categories.
12. Bouthevillain et al., (2001) also introduce other variables that take into account
discretionary fiscal policy measures, in addition to a number of other possible
idiosyncratic features of the economy. For the European Commission, Mourre et al.,
(2014) obtain the value of the budgetary semi-elasticity as a difference of the
corresponding values of revenues and expenditures. Furthermore, they calculate this
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using data for five different tax categories for the former and unemployment-related
expenditures for the latter. Both of these kinds of data were unavailable to us for all
countries. Girouard and Andre, (2005) first applied this approach to the O.E.C.D.; they
used four different tax categories for the revenue side and current expenditures (to reflect
unemployment-related spending) for the expenditure side.
13. For instance, if G.D.P. growth rate is 3% in year t, but was –3% over the last three years,
it is clear that fiscal variables in year t will reflect a negative effect of the business cycle.
While using the observed growth rate in year t would not capture the cyclical position of
the economy (information on previous years is not taken into account), the output gap
would. The same approach is followed in Simon, Sacchi, and Lago-Pe~nas, (2017).
14. In order to check the robustness of results for expenditure and deficit, we used a bias-
corrected least squares dummy variable (L.S.D.V.) estimator, originally proposed by
Kiviet (1995) and extended by Bruno (2003) to unbalanced panels. Whilst short-run
effects (b) were lower, the coefficient on the lagged endogenous variable was higher and
so in the long-run multipliers were more similar.
15. de Castro Fernandez, Basterrechea, Montesinos, Garcıa, and Fuentes, (2018) prove that
social transfers, particularly unemployment-related expenditures, reflect counter-
cyclical behaviour.
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Appendix 1
Table A1. Data on the decomposition of tax revenues in European and Former Yugoslavian coun-


















Croatia 2001–2007 3.1 2.1 12.0 4.2 0.7 0.9 11.7 34.7
Macedonia 2001–2007 2.5 1.3 8.6 3.7 1.7 0.5 9.1 27.4
Montenegro 2001–2007 3.3 1.0 13.7 3.4 2.6 0.8 11.7 36.5
Serbia 2001–2007 5.4 0.9 11.5 4.2 2.3 1.4 12.8 38.5
Slovenia 2001–2007 5.6 2.2 8.3 3.3 0.3 3.8 14.1 37.6
Belgium 2001–2007 12.4 3.1 6.8 2 0.3 4.9 15.6 45.1
Bulgaria 2001–2007 3 2.8 9.1 3.8 1.3 1.1 9.1 30.2
Czech Republic 2001–2007 4.2 4.2 6.1 2.4 1.1 1 14.8 33.8
Denmark 2001–2007 24.5 3.1 9.5 3.8 0 5 1.7 47.6
Germany 2001–2007 8.3 2.1 6.3 2.2 0.6 1.9 17.4 38.8
Estonia 2001–2007 6.1 1.4 8.4 0 3.4 1 10.5 30.8
Ireland 2001–2007 8.9 3.5 7 1.1 1.5 3.6 5.1 30.7
Greece 2001–2007 4.2 2.9 6.8 2.6 0 4.4 12.2 33.1
Spain 2001–2007 6.8 3.6 6 2.3 0 3.6 12.7 35
France 2001–2007 7.8 2.6 7 2.2 0 7 17.5 44.1
Italy 2001–2007 10.4 2.6 5.8 2.3 0 6.8 12.1 40
Cyprus 2001–2007 3.7 4.9 7.5 2.7 1.4 3.6 6.8 30.6
Latvia 2001–2007 5.6 1.9 7.1 3.1 0.2 1.7 8.6 28.2
Lithuania 2001–2007 6.8 1.7 7.2 2.9 0.3 1.1 9.4 29.4
Luxembourg 2001–2007 6.9 6.3 5.9 0.2 4.1 3.6 11.3 38.3
Hungary 2001–2007 6.9 2.3 8 3.2 0.5 4 12.7 37.6
Malta 2001–2007 6.1 4 6.8 2.8 0.5 4.2 7.4 31.8
Netherlands 2001–2007 6.2 3.3 6.9 1.2 1.2 3.8 13.5 36.1
Austria 2001–2007 10.1 2.4 7.7 2.6 0 5 15.1 42.9
Poland 2001–2007 4.4 2.1 7.5 3.7 0.6 2.2 13.5 34
Portugal 2001–2007 5.1 3 7.8 2.7 0.3 3.8 11.3 34
Romania 2001–2007 2.8 2.8 7.3 3 0.7 1.5 10.4 28.5
Slovakia 2001–2007 3.1 2.7 7.2 2.6 0.7 2.1 13 31.4
Finland 2001–2007 13 3.6 8.1 3.7 0 2.4 11.6 42.4
Sweden 2001–2007 16.7 2.8 8.4 2.9 0 11.6 4.1 46.5
United Kingdom 2001–2007 10.1 3.1 6.3 3.4 0 5.1 7.6 35.6
Iceland 2001–2007 13.9 1.5 10 2.3 0.3 6.2 3 37.2
Norway 2001–2007 9.8 9.8 8 2.4 0.1 3.1 9.1 42.3
Switzerland 2001–2007 8.6 2.5 3.5 0.4 1.3 3.9 6.6 26.8
Croatia 2008–2014 3.0 2.3 11.8 3.5 0.4 1.2 11.8 34
Macedonia 2008–2014 2.1 1.1 8.5 3.4 1.0 0.7 8.8 25.6
Montenegro 2008–2014 3.0 1.5 12.7 4.5 1.3 0.3 11.5 34.8
Serbia 2008–2014 4.4 1.4 10.3 4.9 1.3 1.3 12.6 36.2
Slovenia 2008–2014 5.5 1.7 8.2 4.1 0.0 2.7 14.8 37
Belgium 2008–2014 12.3 2.9 6.9 1.8 0.3 5.3 16.4 45.9
Bulgaria 2008–2014 2.9 2.1 9 5 0 1.1 7.2 27.3
Czech Republic 2008–2014 3.6 3.4 7 2.6 1.3 0.8 14.7 33.4
Denmark 2008–2014 25.8 2.4 9.6 3.3 0 4.8 1.3 47.2
Germany 2008–2014 8.6 2.3 7 1.8 0.6 2.1 16.5 38.9
(continued)



















Estonia 2008–2014 5.5 1.5 8.3 0 4.2 1 11.9 32.4
Ireland 2008–2014 9.2 2.4 6.1 0.6 1.8 3.3 5.8 29.2
Greece 2008–2014 5.2 1.9 7 3.3 0.1 5.3 13.2 36
Spain 2008–2014 7.4 2.1 5.3 2.1 0 2.9 12.7 32.5
France 2008–2014 8.2 2.6 6.8 2.2 0 7.3 18.4 45.5
Italy 2008–2014 11.5 2.4 5.9 2.5 0 6.8 13.3 42.4
Cyprus 2008–2014 3.4 6.1 8.4 3 0.3 3.4 7.9 32.5
Latvia 2008–2014 5.8 1.7 6.8 3.3 0 1.8 8.9 28.3
Lithuania 2008–2014 4.1 1.5 7.6 2.9 0.1 0.7 11.5 28.4
Luxembourg 2008–2014 8.4 5.2 6.9 0.2 3.3 3.1 12.2 39.3
Hungary 2008–2014 5.9 1.6 8.7 3.3 0 5.7 13 38.2
Malta 2008–2014 6.4 5.9 7.5 2.9 0 3.7 7 33.4
Netherlands 2008–2014 7.2 2.4 6.6 1.1 1.1 3.6 14.5 36.5
Austria 2008–2014 10 2.1 7.7 2.3 0 5.3 15 42.4
Poland 2008–2014 4.6 2.1 7.4 3.7 0.3 2.2 12.5 32.8
Portugal 2008–2014 6.2 3 7.9 2.1 0.5 3.6 11.8 35.1
Romania 2008–2014 3.4 2.2 7.8 3 0.3 1.6 9.2 27.5
Slovakia 2008–2014 2.9 2.7 6.5 2.7 0 1.7 12.6 29.1
Finland 2008–2014 12.6 2.4 8.7 3.5 0 2.6 12.4 42.2
Sweden 2008–2014 14.9 2.9 9 2.5 0 10.9 3.7 43.9
United Kingdom 2008–2014 9.7 2.8 6.4 3.2 0 5.3 7.9 35.3
Iceland 2008–2014 13.3 2 8 1.9 0.4 6 3.5 35.1
Norway 2008–2014 9.7 9.6 7.6 2 0.1 2.6 9.4 41
Switzerland 2008–2014 8.6 2.8 3.5 0.4 1.1 4 6.6 27
Source: I.M.F., Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Finance of Montenegro and Ministry of
Finance of Serbia.
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